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A Sliding Scale: Nuclear Proliferation Among States	
Why do states engage in nuclear proliferation? Nuclear proliferation is a major security 
issue affecting the international arena. Existing studies debate both the strength and direction of 
determinants of nuclear proliferation and the effect of domestic and international circumstances 
on proliferation. A clear understanding of why states choose to pursue nuclear arms is critical to 
promoting and maintaining international security. By analyzing what factors may make a state 
less prone to proliferation, the international community may incentivize disarmament.  My 
research question considers membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a 
potential correlate of nuclear proliferation. Are countries that are members of the UNSC more 
likely to engage in nuclear proliferation compared to countries that are not elected to the UNSC?   	
Current scholarly research suggests many factors for proliferation. Existing literature 
cites three types of determinants: technological determinants, external determinants, and 
domestic determinants (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 862). States that are more technologically 
advanced are more likely to develop nuclear weapons due to a universal appeal of nuclear arms 
and the reduced costs of acquiring nuclear weapons compared to less advanced states (Singh & 
Way, 2004, p. 862; Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 167). External determinants, such as perceived 
security threats, cause a state to develop nuclear weapons in order to balance against a rival 
state’s nuclear capabilities or a conventional threat. An alliance with a major power, on the other 
hand, diminishes the probability of proliferation (Bleek & Lorber, 2013, p. 1; Jo & Gartzke, 
2007, p. 185; Singh & Way, 2004, p. 863). Some argue that in relation to the democratic peace 
theory, the pacifying effects of democracy and interdependence among democratic states reduce 
the ambition to pursue nuclear weapons. Quantitative tests have found that economic integration 
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deters nuclear proliferation, because states do not wish to threaten economic partners (Singh & 
Way, 2004, p. 864). 	
Scholars have also tested the effects of signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on nuclear proliferation, though they have reached different 
conclusions. Jo and Gartzke found that while states that have ratified the NPT ratification are less 
likely to initiate nuclear programs, NPT ratification has not deterred proliferation at the system 
level (Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 167). However, Bleek and Lorber found that NPT ratification is 
significantly and negatively linked to all stages of proliferation (Bleek & Lorber, 2013, p. 12).	
To continue the discussion of how different factors affect nuclear proliferation, I study 
how being a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) affects a state’s status on 
nuclear proliferation. I also control for NPT ratification and enduring rivalry. The first section of 
this paper states my hypotheses and the rationale behind my predictions. The next section 
explains the construction of the dataset and coding for the variables. I then analyze the data using 
ordered logistic regression and discuss my findings. The last section contains a brief overview of 
considerations for future research.	
THEORY	
As Singh and Way (2004), among other scholars cited above, theorize, both external and 
internal factors affect a state’s decision to proliferate. I further examine this by introducing a new 
independent variable, membership in the U.N. Security Council, in a model in conjunction with 
variables studied by other scholars. I adopt Singh and Way’s use of a continuum as the 
dependent variable to separate the various stages a state may reach towards proliferation. The 
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different stages are: no significant interest in nuclear weapons, serious exploration of nuclear 
weapons, pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, and acquisition of nuclear weapons (Singh & 
Way, 2004, p. 861). 	
United Nations Security Council. I analyze the effect of membership in the United 
Nations Security Council on nuclear proliferation. The UNSC is charged with maintaining 
international peace and security and handles many issues relating to deterrence (United Nations, 
1945). In order to maintain international security, members of the council must protect 
themselves against potential aggressors. Thus, I expect elected states to be more likely to have at 
least explored nuclear weapons. In addition, after a state has been elected to the UNSC, it is more 
likely to want to increase its own security in order to legitimize its authority as part of the 
council. It may also do so to deter retaliation from other states as a result of the policies it helps 
create and impose. 	
Hypothesis 1: States that are members of the United Nations Security Council are more 
likely to engage in nuclear proliferation.	
NPT Ratification. I also measure the effect of ratifying the Treaty on the Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons on proliferation. The NPT is currently the only multilateral binding 
agreement dedicated to disarmament. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms 
limitation and disarmament agreement (Unites Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, n.d.). 
Although it explicitly prohibits the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the goal of the NPT to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons may implicitly discourage the exploration and pursuit of 
nuclear weapons as well. I do not consider the relationship between being a signatory of the NPT 
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and acquisition of nuclear weapons in my model because of perfect prediction, save for a few 
violations of the NPT. 	
Hypothesis 2: States that have ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons are less likely to explore or pursue nuclear weapons. 	
Enduring rivalry. Lastly, I analyze whether a state participates in an enduring rivalry in 
any given year. A vast majority of wars and militarized disputes occur within enduring rivalries, 
supporting the argument that the presence of an enduring rivalry is a significant security threat 
(Singh & Way, 2004, p. 869). A state that has a history of rivalry with another state is more 
likely to sense an urgency to develop nuclear weapons to protect itself. States whose rivals 
possess nuclear weapons are also more likely to develop nuclear weapons to defend against a 
potential preemptive strike. 	
Hypothesis 3: States that are involved in enduring rivalries are more likely to engage in 
nuclear proliferation. 	
METHODOLOGY	
Dependent Variable	
The dataset is based on that from Singh and Way’s article (2004). The unit of analysis, 
country-year, analyzes 154 countries from 1945-2000 (Singh & Way, 2004, 861). The dependent 
variable is the level of nuclear proliferation that a state reaches. Because some states may express 
interest in nuclear weapons or start to build nuclear weapons but never progress to detonating 
them, I use Singh and Way’s coding of placing proliferation on a continuum from 0 to 3. This 
accounts for states having many possible stopping points while on the path to proliferation. 0 
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demonstrates that a state has expressed no interest in nuclear weapons, 1 serious exploration of 
the possibility of developing weapons, 2 substantial efforts to develop weapons, and 3 
acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. Exploration is coded for the year a country first 
considers building nuclear weapons, as shown by political authorization or research by defense 
agencies that may oversee potential weapons development. Pursuit is defined as when states 
make an active effort to gain nuclear weapons, such as through a cabinet-level political decision 
or movement toward weaponization. Acquisition is coded from the year a country has its first 
explosion or possession of a nuclear weapon (Singh & Way, 2004, p. 866-867). If a country 
renounces its nuclear weapons, subsequent years are coded as 0 to indicate no further interest in 
nuclear weapons.	
Singh and Way break down the level of nuclear proliferation variable into separate 
dichotomous variables for the stages of exploration, pursuit, and acquisition. I utilize these to 
analyze how the independent variables affect whether a state achieves each stage of the nuclear 
continuum. Once a country achieves a value of 1 for a stage during a specific year, observations 
for future years under that stage are dropped and coded as missing. I employ ordered logistic 
regression because the dependent variable is ordinal. I cluster using country codes established by 
the Correlates of War project, so that observations for various years are grouped by country 
(Correlates of War Project, 2006). This accounts for the inherent correlation of observations 
made within the same country. 	
Independent Variables	
I create a dichotomous variable for the years that a state is elected into the UNSC. 
The dichotomous variable utilizes 0 for non-membership during a country-year and 1 for 
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membership. The coding for membership in the United Nations Security Council is taken 
from the United Nations website (United States Security Council, 2013). Countries are 
elected for two-year terms, although a few countries served on the council for just one year 
in a given period. 	
Several countries posed coding challenges. Taiwan, officially known as the 
Republic of China, was originally a permanent member of the UNSC until its seat was 
replaced by the People’s Republic of China in October 1971 (United Nations Gneral 
Assembly, 1971). I code Taiwan as a member of the UNSC until 1971 and China as a 
member from 1971 onwards. Both are coded as 1 in 1971 because each was a member for a 
portion of the year. The United Arab Republic, consisting of Egypt and Syria, was a 
member of the UNSC from 1961-1962 (United Nations, n.d.). However, it split in October 
1961, after which Egypt adopted the original name. Syria and Egypt are both coded as 
members separately in 1961, but only Egypt is coded as a member in 1962. 	
The data on whether a state is an NPT signatory is merged from a dataset created by 
Jo and Gartzke (2007). The variable is dichotomous, with a 0 representing a state that did 
not ratify the treaty during that year and a 1 representing a state that ratified it. The dataset’s 
observations span from 1939 to 1992, while Singh and Way’s observations span from 1945-
2000. When I merge Jo and Gartzke’s data into Singh and Way’s dataset, observations prior 
to 1945 are dropped, and the values for the NPT ratification after 1992 are coded as 
missing. 	
The variable for enduring rivalry is from Singh and Way’s original dataset (2004). 
The presence of an enduring rivalry accounts for a significant portion of the security threat 
Liu 7	
	
	
facing a state. The authors adopt coding from another article by Bennet (1998) and utilize a 
dichotomous variable whose value is 1 if the state is involved in one or more enduring 
rivalries in a given year, and is 0 if not. There are no issues of multicollinearity, or 
correlations of ±0.6 or greater, among the variables in my models. Because the variables for 
exploration, pursuit, and acquisition of nuclear weapons are combined into the variable for 
level of nuclear proliferation, there is logically a high correlation of the three with the level 
of nuclear proliferation. To avoid multicollinearity, I perform regressions for exploration, 
pursuit, and acquisition separately from the regression on level of nuclear proliferation. The 
correlation table is below: 	
             |    level  explore   pursue  acquire  rivalry npt_rati     UNSC	
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------	
       level |   1.0000 	
     explore |   0.9240   1.0000 	
      pursue |   0.4858   0.4466   1.0000 	
     acquire |   0.2813   0.1996   0.2423   1.0000 	
     rivalry |   0.3062   0.0688   0.0724   0.0542   1.0000 	
    npt_rati |  -0.0775  -0.0324  -0.0279  -0.0358  -0.0936   1.0000 	
        UNSC |   0.4056   0.0397   0.0303   0.0451   0.1256  -0.0322   1.0000	
DISCUSSION	
Before testing my variables, I explore the distribution of states on the nuclear 
proliferation continuum (Graph 1). This information allows a more detailed understanding 
of the statuses of states on nuclear proliferation. Only countries that have at minimum 
shown interest in nuclear proliferation, or that have been coded as 1 or higher for the level 
variable, are analyzed. If a country has reached multiple stages of nuclear proliferation, the 
achievement of each stage is factored into the calculations in order to holistically gauge 
how far countries overall have progressed on the continuum. Almost half of the countries 
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studied have explored weapons, but less than a third have seriously pursued nuclear 
weapons, and less than a quarter have acquired them. However, these observations are 
limited by their small sample size, as over 90% of 152 countries in the dataset have shown 
no interest in domestic nuclear programs.  	
Graph 1	
	
Table 1 shows that although hypotheses 1 and 3 hold true, hypothesis 2 is proven 
incorrect. Countries that are members of the United Nations Security Council are 2.25 times 
more likely to achieve a higher rating on the level of nuclear proliferation than countries 
that are not members. Countries that experience enduring rivalry are also significantly more 
likely to achieve a higher rating than countries that do not have enduring rivalry, although 
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the coefficient is 1.78, which denotes a smaller effect than that of the UNSC variable. Both 
relationships are significant because they have a P-value of 0.00.	
Ratification of the NPT has no significant relationship with a state’s status on 
nuclear proliferation. This finding was unexpected because states that are resolved against 
acquiring nuclear weapons may be assumed to also be less likely to explore and pursue 
nuclear weapons. In addition, the result challenges the conclusions of Jo and Gartzke 
(2007) and Bleek and Lorber (2013). The disparity may be explained by my simplistic 
model, which has only a few independent variables and focuses on external determinants of 
nuclear proliferation. By adding variables such as technological development and economic 
factors into a future model, signatory status may become significant. 	
Other explanations for the lack of significance include the circumstances 
surrounding the treaty. Signing the NPT may not necessarily change state preferences for 
exploring or pursuing weapons (Jo & Gartzke, 2007, p. 179). Many treaties are signed as 
formalities because they represent actions states would have undertaken regardless of the 
presence of the treaty (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996, p. 380). In this vein, the NPT 
may have been ineffective in deterring nuclear proliferation because states have agreed to 
avoid acquiring nuclear capability, but may continue to explore and pursue weapons. 	
Table 1: Factors Affecting Level of Nuclear Proliferation 
 
Independent Variables:  
Level of Nuclear Proliferation 
Coefficient (R.S.E.)                          P-Value 
Rivalry 1.782 
(.476) 
0.000 
NPT Ratification -.495 
(.372) 
0.183 
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UNSC 2.252 
(.480) 
0.000 
*Bolded coefficients are significant at the p<0.05 level. 
     I disaggregate each stage of proliferation from the variable for level of proliferation in 
order to consider the effects of the independent variables on each stage. Before executing the 
regression, NPT ratification seems to reduce the likelihood that the state will explore and pursue 
nuclear weapons (Graph 2). This is in accordance with the belief that signing the treaty deters 
proliferation. However, a logistic regression demonstrates that NPT ratification still has an 
insignificant effect on proliferation (Table 2). A near-significant relationship is found between 
exploration of nuclear weapons and ratification of the NPT. States that have signed the NPT are -
0.90 times less likely to explore nuclear weapons, but there is a 6.1% probability of the observed 
relationship being due to chance. I include the independent variables of rivalry and UNSC 
membership in this model in order to take into account their explanatory power. The UNSC and 
rivalry variables stay significant, except for the effect of UNSC membership on pursuit, which is 
just above the threshold of significance.	
Graph 2	
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Table 2: Stages of Nuclear Proliferation 
 
Independent Variables:  
         Exploration  
Coefficient  
(R.S.E.)      P-Value 
           Pursuit                        Acquire 
Coefficient                   Coefficient 
(R.S.E.)      P-value      (R.S.E.)      P-value 
Rivalry 1.878 
(.430) 
0.000 2.894 
(.754) 
0.000 2.821 
(1.123) 
0.012 
NPT Ratification* -.903 
(.481) 
0.061 -.935 
(.658) 
0.155 --* --* 
UNSC 1.172 
(.451) 
0.009 .988 
(.577) 
0.087 1.690 
(.704) 
0.023 
*Npt_rati is omitted due to perfect prediction. The NPT prohibits signatories from acquiring nuclear weapons.  
To further explore the effect of UNSC membership on state behavior, I analyze the 
differences between members of the UNSC and non-members and the average action they 
take regarding proliferation. I utilize the dichotomous variables of whether a state explored, 
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pursued, or acquired nuclear weapons to separate the effects for each stage on the nuclear 
continuum. States that have been members of the UNSC show higher means of exploration, 
pursuit, and acquisition (Graph 3). This provides additional support for hypothesis 1, and 
predicts that members of the UNSC are more likely to exhibit higher levels of nuclear 
proliferation than states that are not members of the UNSC.  
Graph 3	
	
CONCLUSION	
 Although nuclear proliferation is a growing concern, there are a limited number of 
nuclear states. Thus, the small sample size of states that have acquired nuclear weapons 
constrains the applicability of my findings. In order to limit observations to before the year 2000, 
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I also did not code for countries that were elected to the United Nations Security Council after 
2000. 	
 Future studies on proliferation may include an updated dataset in order to analyze how 
states’ attitudes towards nuclear proliferation have evolved. Controls, such as whether 
proliferation occurred during the Cold War and geographical region may be added. Motivations 
to proliferate during the Cold War may differ from motivations during other time periods due to 
the global political climate. Different regions may also share traits that affect states’ decisions to 
proliferate. In addition, the coding of being a party to the NPT can be modified to include states 
that have acceded or succeeded to the NPT to analyze if a significant relationship exists. 	
Further research may also help explain why some states back down or reverse their 
decision to proliferate. Some states have voluntarily given up their nuclear arsenal or stopped 
their pursuit and exploration -- no longer exhibiting interest in nuclear weapons. A comparison 
of some of the traits of these countries may uncover findings about how to promote disarmament. 
The threat of nuclear warfare and immense consequences of unchecked nuclear proliferation 
demand immediate attention. As the international community works to establish peace and 
security among countries, it must better understand the basis for nuclear proliferation before it 
can successfully promote non-proliferation and global disarmament.    	
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